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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2313 
___________ 
 
RANCE M. STRUNK, SR.; DARLENE STRUNK; CLIFFORD B. REPOTSKI; 
CYNTHIA M. YODER; R.A.Y. (Minor), 
      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
EAST COVENTRY TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
MISTIE GREENWALT, Officer; CHRISTOPHER JASON, Officer;  
CHESTER COUNTY DETECTIVE JOSEPH WALTON; D/C RICHARD 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-00824) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 1, 2016 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 The Appellants appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
 In 2011, the police were provided with computer discs containing child 
pornography that had been left in a residence once used by Clifford Repotski.  Based in 
part on those discs, the police obtained a warrant to arrest Repotski.  The arrest was made 
at a home that Repotski shared with Rance Strunk, Sr., and Darlene Strunk (his 
grandparents), Cynthia Yoder (his mother), and a minor identified as “R.A.Y.” (his 
brother).  Repotski was charged with possession with intent to distribute child 
pornography and related crimes.  He later pleaded guilty to four of the five charges 
against him.   
 Thereafter, Repotski, the Strunks, Yoder, and R.A.Y. filed a complaint under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which they later amended, alleging violations of their constitutional rights 
in connection with Repotski’s arrest.  They named as defendants the Chester County 
Detectives Division, “D/C Richard,” Detective Joseph Walton, the East Coventry 
Township Police Department, Officer Mistie Greenwalt, and Officer Christopher Jason.  
The Chester County Detectives Division and Detective Walton moved to dismiss the 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court 
granted that motion as to the Chester County Detectives Division, holding that a 
municipal police department is not a proper party defendant in a § 1983 action.  The 
District Court also observed that the complaint “contain[ed] no facts and no numbered 
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paragra[ph]s, merely setting forth vague and random citations to Pennsylvania and 
Federal law[,]” but permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.  After the plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint, the defendants filed motions to dismiss.  The District Court 
granted those motions, concluding that (1) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), 
barred the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; (2) 
Officers Greenwalt and Jason did not participate in the search of the home; (3) the 
Township was not liable because there were no underlying constitutional violations; and 
(4) various remaining claims failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8.  The plaintiffs appealed.1   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo the District 
Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  See Dique v. N.J. State 
Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).  We accept as true all of the allegations 
contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  See 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam).  To survive dismissal, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may affirm on any basis 
                                              
1 A notice of appeal in a civil case in which the United States is not a party must be filed 
within 30 days of the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed.  Fed. R. App. P.  
4(a)(1)(A).  Although the plaintiffs failed to file their notice of appeal within 30 days of 
the order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the District Court subsequently 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to extend the time to appeal under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and deemed their appeal timely filed.  See Ramseur v. Beyer, 
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supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam).  
 As noted, the District Court held that the Appellants’ false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims were barred by Heck.  Heck holds that, 
where success in a § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction 
or sentence, an individual’s suit for damages or equitable relief is barred unless he can 
demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 
486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).  Thus, Heck bars only 
claims which “seek[] to recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction, 
imprisonment, or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render the 
conviction or sentence unlawful.”  Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 
1998).  We have held that Heck requires District Courts to determine whether each claim 
– if successful – would imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.  Gibson v. 
Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 447-49 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a determination 
whether Heck applies to a Fourth Amendment claim requires a case-by-case fact-based 
inquiry).   
 We agree that Heck barred the Appellants’ malicious prosecution claim because 
Repotski’s conviction has not been invalidated.2  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.  But, 
                                                                                                                                                  
921 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1990). 
2 The malicious prosecution claims should have been dismissed without prejudice, 
however, and we will modify the District Court’s order to that effect.  See Curry v. 
Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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contrary to the District Court’s conclusion, the claims for false arrest and false 
imprisonment are not the type contemplated by Heck.  See Montgomery v. De Simone, 
159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998).  Dismissal of those claims was appropriate, 
however, because the Appellants failed to plausibly allege that Repotski’s arrest was not 
supported by probable cause.  See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff alleging false imprisonment must demonstrate that his 
arrest was unsupported by probable cause); cf. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 
514 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that although the issue of probable cause is usually a factual 
one, a court “may conclude that ‘probable cause did exist as a matter of law if the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to [the p]laintiff, reasonably would not support a 
contrary factual finding” (internal citation and quotations omitted)).   
 Repotski was arrested pursuant to a warrant that was supported by an affidavit of 
probable cause, both of which were attached to the Appellants’ amended complaint.  See 
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that a court may consider 
exhibits attached to the complaint in adjudicating a motion to dismiss).  Where an arrest 
is made pursuant to a warrant, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for false arrest must 
adequately plead that “(1) that the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a 
falsehood in applying for a warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are 
material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 
781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
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1997)).  The Appellants failed to meet this burden.  Although they contended that the 
officers’ statements inaccurately referred to the computer discs containing child 
pornography as “abandoned,” the Appellants did not allege that the officers “‘must have 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] statements or had obvious reasons to 
doubt the accuracy of the information [they] reported.’”  Id. at 788 (quoting United States 
v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)).  In fact, the Appellants appear to 
acknowledge that the officers characterized the discs as “abandoned” because the person 
who turned them in to the police explained that the discs had been left in Repotski’s 
former residence.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court 
properly rejected the Appellants’ false arrest and false imprisonment claims.  
 The District Court also correctly dismissed the Appellants’ remaining claims.  In 
particular, we agree that the Appellants could not sustain their claims of an illegal search 
against Officers Jason and Greenwalt because they did not actively participate in the 
search of the home.  Rather, other officers not named in the action executed the search.  
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (liability under § 1983 
requires personal involvement in the alleged wrongs).  In addition, the Appellants failed 
to adequately set forth a basis for relief against “D/C Richard” and Detective Walton.  
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  “D/C Richard” was included in the caption and mentioned in 
one paragraph of the amended complaint.  The only substantive reference to Detective 
Walton indicates that he was “going to be conducting forensic analysis of the items 
seized” after being contacted by another police officer.  Even construing the complaint 
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liberally and in a light most favorable to the Appellants, we discern no viable claims or 
grounds for relief based on these vague references to “D/C Richard” and Detective 
Walton.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 179 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that to plead a conspiracy claim properly, a plaintiff must allege 
“facts that plausibly suggest a meeting of the minds”).   
 Furthermore, the Appellants appear to seek relief under various statutes – such as 
Pennsylvania criminal laws, the state Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act – but, to the extent that these statutes allow a 
private cause of action, their allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for 
relief.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).  Finally, the Chester County Detectives 
Division is not a proper party, see Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1997), and the Appellants did not identify any official policy or custom of the 
East Coventry Township Police Department that was the cause of the alleged 
constitutional violations, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment, but we 
modify its order to reflect that the malicious prosecution claim is dismissed without 
prejudice.  See supra note 2.  The Appellants’ request for a certificate of appealability is 
denied, as is their request to introduce material not pleaded in the complaint.  See Maio v. 
Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 485, n.12 (3d Cir. 2000). 
